Abstract: Ethnic gap remains a persistent challenge for Viet Nam. This paper aims at exploring mechanisms driving to ethnic inequality by analysing the formation of risk sharing networks in rural areas. After showing important differences in the networks of ethnic minority and of Kinh households, both in terms of size and similarity attributes, we expose the concept of homophily in link formation that we expect to be a main mechanism driving to such differences. We disentangle baseline homophily which derives from the differentiated local distribution of ethnic groups, from inbreeding homophily which results from preference to form homogenous links even in heterogenous environments, and is associated to cultural and social distance between ethnic groups. We estimate various models to investigate the determinants of risk sharing networks attributes, among which ethnicity, geography, individual and household characteristics, as well as ethnic composition. Results show, as expected, that ethnic minorities have smaller and less diversified networks than the majority. Ethnicity plays a direct role through the combination of baseline and inbreeding homophily mechanisms. Inbreeding homophily is found to be stronger among the Kinh majority, leading to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from Kinh networks, which are supposed to be more efficient to cope with covariant risk because they are more diversified in the occupation and location of their members. This evidence suggests that inequalities among ethnic groups in Viet Nam are partly rooted in the cultural and social distances between them.
1

Introduction
Accounting for only 15 per cent of the population but 70 per cent of Viet Nam's extreme poor (World Bank, 2012) , ethnic minorities lag behind the Kinh majority despite Government's effort to narrow the ethnic gap through numerous poverty alleviation programmes. 1 Poverty of ethnic minorities remains a persistent challenge for the country.
The reasons for the existence and the persistence of this gap despite the fast economic growth and high pace of poverty reduction experienced in Viet Nam over the last decade have been explored in the literature. Research highlights the existence of inequalities in the endowments between ethnic groups with a strong emphasis on geographical factor, but also shows differences in the returns to these endowments between Kinh and non-Kinh, mainly regarding education, land holding, and access to credit (Baulch et al. 2007 (Baulch et al. , 2012 Imai et al., 2015; Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Singhal and Beck, 2015) . In this paper, we investigate the question of the ethnic inequality using the angle of risk sharing and social networks formation. We are motivated by the fact that risk, and the necessity to cope with it, is a pervasive feature of rural economic life, particularly in Viet Nam's mountainous areas, where ethnic minorities mostly live. There, the prevalence of risk is accentuated by climate change, by difficulties to cultivate fragile uplands, and by high transport costs, and is combined with low access to basic infrastructure, public services, and formal insurance (Van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2001; Imai et al., 2011; Tran, 2015) . In this context of missing or failing market, the literature demonstrates the importance of the prevalence of bad shocks to explain the persistence of poverty (Morduch, 1994) , and highlights risk sharing networks as a dominant means to cope with shocks for rural poor (Rockenbauch and Sakdapolrak, 2017) .
Ethnic minorities in Vietam mostly live in mountainous areas while the Kinh majority is present all over the country, while more concentrated in the lowland areas. This spatial segregation leads to important differences in endowments between ethnic groups, as well as in occupations, and in risk sharing networks. Yet, we expect that in addition to these important factors, ethnicity also plays a direct role in the formation of social networks (Grimard, 1997 ) that leads to further dissimilarities as it may affect the ability of ethnic minority and majority groups to cope with shocks.
Literature on homophily in link formation suggests that having similar characteristics like ethnicity is a strong predictor of two individuals being connected. Assortativity patterns could be a main mechanism of ethnic segregation (Jackson et al., 2016; Currarini et al., 2009; McPherson et al., 2001) . Segregation can occur because of a lack of opportunities and/or low preferences to interact with people from different ethnic group. The opportunities for a group to interact with another group, defined as baseline homophily, depends on the size of the ethnic groups. Because the Kinh majority group constitutes 85% of the population while the 53 other ethnic groups account for the remaining part, opportunities to exchange with people from different ethnic group may differ a great deal across majority and minority ethnic groups. Opportunities to form a link thus depend on the local distribution of ethnic groups. Preference to interact with people from the same ethnic group is called inbreeding homophily in the literature. Prejudice and stereotypes regarding ethnic minority people are prevalent in Vietnam, suggesting the existence of social and cultural distance across ethnic groups and differentiated preferences to interethnic interactions. It 2 could lead to higher exclusion of non-Kinh people from Kinh risk sharing network than predicted by their demography and local distribution. Thus, local distribution of ethnic groups and social distance across ethnic groups may explain differences in similarity patterns across ethnic group social networks.
In this paper, we first describe various attributes of the risk sharing networks of households from the majority ethnic group and from minority ethnic groups and their differences. Ethnic minority groups are embedded in smaller risk sharing networks, which may imply a lower capacity to pool the risks. In addition, their network is characterized by higher similarity patterns in terms of occupation and location. Being connected with people with the same economic activity and living in the same village is expected to be less efficient when coping with covariant shocks. Indeed, covariant shocks, by definition, similarly affect people having the same activity and residing in the same geographical area. Starting from these observations, this paper aims at understanding which mechanisms are driving to these observed differences, other than differences in geography and in socio-economic conditions that we control for through fixed effects and other control variables. Here, we focus on ethnic homophily as a main mechanism of differentiation, and disentangle baseline homophily that is explained by differences in the local distribution of ethnic groups, from inbreeding homophily that results from preferences, and from cultural and social distance between ethnic groups. Providing empirical evidence on the impact of ethnicity on network formation is challenging since it requires identifying exogenous variations in ethnic composition at the local level. Our approach is to provide an in-depth descriptive assessment on the formation of risk sharing networks by characterizing the differences in network's structure between the ethnic minority and majority groups, and by analysing multivariate correlations between ethnic composition within communes, geography, and risk sharing network features.
The contribution of this paper is threefold. First, it provides evidence in a developing country on the role played by ethnicity in the formation of risk sharing networks, and distinguishes various mechanisms through which it acts. The literature on this issue is up to now scarce. Yet, better understanding the differences in risk sharing networks between ethnic groups is likely to provide valuable information to address the ethnic gap which is a challenging issue in the context of Viet Nam. Second, it provides a representative picture of the risk sharing formation process on a large scale (at least provincial level), going beyond most of studies on risk sharing network, that limit the validity of their results to some unrepresentative villages in a country. In addition, link formation outside the village is taken into consideration. This is all the more important since several studies have shown that the village is not the relevant risk sharing unit (Grimard, 1997 , Jaramillo et al., 2015 . Finally, by combining census and spatial data, along with household survey data, it links information on ethnicity composition and geographical environment at a very detailed level that is the commune. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time it has been done for Viet Nam. The rest of our paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the conceptual background of the paper; the dataset and definitions are shown in section 3. Section 4 then provides our descriptive analysis. We present our estimation strategy and results in section 5 and briefly conclude in section 6.
2
Conceptual background
Importance of risk sharing network in the strategies to cope with risk
It is widely known that risks are highly prevalent in rural areas of developing countries and risk is considered a cause of poverty and its persistence (Fafchamps et al., 1998, Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006) . However, people in rural and remote areas do not have sufficient wealth to absorb the negative shocks while the formal mechanisms and institutions to deal with risks are limited in those areas.
The adverse impacts of high exposure to shocks, nevertheless, could be compensated or mitigated by households' strategy to reduce their impact. Literature has well documented the set of these strategies (Dercon, 2002) , particularly risk sharing arrangements, where households share the risk with others through transfers in gift, money and/or labour.
Risk sharing has been investigated theoretically and empirically in a vast literature, suggesting various forms of risk sharing networks. The theoretical works are based on a Pareto optimal model of risk pooling, conditional on the enforceability of risk sharing agreements/contracts (Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Townsend, 1994; Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) . Different motivations lead households to engage in risk sharing arrangements with other households. While risk-aversion is the main driver of risk sharing network formation, they can be sustained only if informal mechanisms of enforcement are at play, in contexts where reliance on the court system is not possible. Repeated game theory is one kind of possible enforcement mechanism in informal arrangements (Fafchamps, 2011) . In the absence of altruism, long-term strategic interactions with expectation for mutual help and reciprocity may be sufficient to guarantee sustainable risk sharing arrangements. It is less true when shocks are persistent. Emotions such as altruism, guilt or shame which are usually embedded in redistributive social norms constitute another enforcement mechanism.
Homophily as central pattern of risk sharing network formation
Another strand of the literature on risk sharing networks investigates the formation of links. In this literature, to which this paper aims at contributing, the question is not why people form links with others, but with whom they choose to connect. One of the most pervasive patterns of link formation is homophily: having similar characteristics is generally a strong and significant predictor of two individuals being connected (McPherson et al., 2001) . Although the benefit from sharing income risk is the largest when people have uncorrelated or negatively correlated incomes, and therefore when they have different characteristics, it is widely observed that links are more likely to be formed when social and geographical distance is the lowest. Indeed, distance also raises the cost of establishing and maintaining interpersonal links, and weakens enforcement mechanisms. Numerous empirical studies illustrate this pattern, like Fafchamps and Gubert (2007) , who find that informal arrangements in rural Philippines are based on social and geographical proximity.
Homophily may impact risk sharing efficiency through three channels. First, it could make the size of the network smaller than the optimal size as individuals connect mostly with close or similar individuals. Based on the hypothesis of single-person deviation alone, theoretical models predict that larger groups allow for more diversification of shocks, leading to higher gains from sharing risk (Genicot and Ray, 2003) . 3 Second, social and geographical proximity may impede the risk pooling group to diversify their risk, especially when covariant risks are predominant. Neighbours are more likely to face simultaneously a covariant shock like flood or pest making risk sharing arrangements unsustainable. Households sharing the same activity in the same area will be similarly impacted by crop or input price changes. Due to a limited resource endowment, risk sharing networks of a poor ethnic minority community have less capacity to smoothen income variation within this community. Studying income diversification in rural Kerala, Johny et al. (2017) show that caste based homophily negatively affects the risk management strategy: networks with strong intra-caste connections associate with less diversification of income sources. Third, homophily reversely helps to cope with idiosyncratic shocks by lowering transaction costs or information asymmetries, and by strengthening mutual enforcement. Using randomized experiments across 34 Indian villages, Chandrasekhar et al. (2014) demonstrate that socially close individuals maintain high levels of cooperation even when contract enforcement is removed, while more distant individuals do not. Attanasio et al. (2012) observe from an experiment conducted in 70 Colombian communities that close individuals are more likely to join the same risk pooling group and they group assortatively on risk attitudes, while socially distant participants group less and rarely assort. They conclude that social homophily is a necessary condition to benefit from advantages to grouping assortatively on risk attitudes.
Baseline and inbreeding homophily to explain ethnic segregation in the networks
Yet, the role of ethnic-based homophily in risk sharing network formation has been poorly documented, especially in developing countries. Existing studies on ethnic-based homophily mostly deal with friendship network formation in developed countries. Notably, Currarini et al. (2009) examine friendship patterns in US high schools. Their theoretical model and empirical estimation show that larger ethnic groups form significantly more friendships per capita. In addition, larger ethnic groups tend to form more ties with people from the same ethnic group and fewer from other ethnic groups than small ethnic groups. McPherson et al. (2001) or Jackson et al. (2016) review other empirical studies demonstrating similar results.
Sociologists have decomposed ethnic based homophily into two mechanisms: the first one, called baseline homophily, relies on ethnic composition and demographic of ethnic groups; the second one, called inbreeding homophily, on preferences. According to baseline homophily, link formation across ethnic groups depends on their relative size. The demography conditions the potential tie pool, i.e the opportunities of a group to interact with another group. The more numerous an ethnic group, the more likely is one of its member to meet and thus to interact with someone from the same ethnic group. As for inbreeding homophily, it refers to a selection process within the set of opportunities to interact, or in other words the preference of interacting with someone from the same ethnic group. As a result, the propensity for ethnic groups to form links with co-ethnic people exceeds their relative fractions in the population. Various reasons for inbreeding homophily can be found in the literature: shared cultural traits and other co-ethnic related factors like language would help people to interact more effectively and on a longer term, to be better able to judge their co-ethnic's characteristics, to use information or rules to maintain the effective cooperation (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005) or to apply social sanctioning (Khwaja, 5 2009; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005) . ʻOther-regarding preferencesʼ may be another reason as far as people tend to care more about the welfare of their co-ethnic people than the one of non coethnic people (Habyarimana et al., 2007) .
Contribution of the paper to the risk sharing network literature
From literature on homophily in link formation, mostly relating to developed countries, one might expect that ethnic groups have different risk sharing network structures in terms of size and similarity, which in turn could affect the efficiency of these networks to cope with covariant and idiosyncratic risks. To the best of our knowledge, no study investigates the difference among ethnic groups in terms of the risk sharing networks in developing countries, although this may explain why some ethnic groups are more vulnerable to shocks than others. One exception is Arcand and Jaimovich (2014) . Relying on the census of almost complete networks in 59 villages in The Gambia, they investigate whether ethnic diversity within villages affects the structure of networks where land, labour, inputs, and credit are exchanged. In particular, they test if ethnic fragmentation and polarization explain features of the exchange network, which are its density, its compactness, and its clustering, or affect the probability of forming a link with individuals from the same ethnic group. The authors find no evidence of any effects of ethnic diversity on the network architecture or on the probability to form a link. In addition, they find that households belonging to ethnic minorities do not have less economic interactions on average. However, as acknowledged by the authors, this study has been conducted in a very specific context where religion and culture are common to most villagers despite ethnic heterogeneity. This leads the authors to call for other evidence about the effect of ethnic diversity on social networks in context where social distance between ethnic groups is observed. In addition, exchange networks may substantively differ from risk sharing networks as they include effective exchanges and not the potential ones.
This paper aims at contributing to the literature on the risk sharing formation by investigating whether and why ethnic minority groups in Viet Nam differ in the structure of their network compared to the ethnic majority group. Structure is approached here by the size and the similarity patterns of the network. The idea is to scrutinize two mechanisms that are baseline homophily and inbreeding homophily. In other words, we try to disentangle the effects of demography of ethnic groups and their local distribution from the effect of social distance between ethnic groups. While doing so, we take into account the heterogeneity of geographical environment explaining differences in the cost of forming and maintaining links.
Relevance and evidence in the context of Viet Nam
This question is particularly relevant in the context of Viet Nam, as it provides new insights on the persistence of the ethnic gap. Although ethnic gap remains one important challenge of the political agenda, inequalities in risk sharing networks across ethnic groups have not yet been examined, even less their underlying mechanisms. However, scattered and circumstantial evidence suggests that ethnic-based difference in risk sharing networks is an issue in Viet Nam. Zylberberg (2010) finds that households from ethnic minorities participate significantly less in risk-pooling in the aftermath of a typhoon than Kinh do. Tran (2015) finds that the Kinh have larger risk sharing networks than households from ethnic minority groups.
In addition, recent migration patterns make the local distribution of ethnic groups of great interest as it presents a large spectrum of situation. Oversimplifying, Kinh people mainly occupied the delta and the coastal areas, while ethnic minorities lived in the highland areas, 6 especially in Northern and Central Viet Nam. Until the Independence, mixed communes with Kinh and ethnic minority people were rare (Déry, 2003) .
4 From the Independence but especially after the reunification in 1975, voluntarist resettlement policy has been conducted by the government. Numerous Kinh households have moved to the mountainous areas and lived with the ethnic minorities for the purpose, among others, of integrating ethnic minorities in the country's political path and building national unity (Mc Elwee, 2004; Saint-Macary, 2014) . According to the Marxist theory of nationalities, the minorities must, in contact with Kinh majority, change their habits and adopt new practices (Hardy and Nguyen, 2004) . Policies of sedentarization of ethnic minority communities practicing slash-and-burn agriculture started to be implemented in the same period (Nguyen et al., 2017) . In addition, existence of settlements due to government programmes gave rise to networks and spontaneous migration (Hardy, 2003) . It is estimated that between 1976 and the late 90s, up to six million people resettled in the whole country (UNDP, 1998). As a result, the ethnic composition of mountainous areas has completely changed, and communes mixing Kinh with ethnic minority people are a relatively recent phenomenon. Compared to ethnic minority groups, Kinh people benefit from demographic preponderance but also from being spread in the whole territory. As such, their potential tie pool is much larger and more widely spread. According to baseline homophily, one should expect larger risk sharing networks with more co-ethnics and less geographical and occupational similarity.
Finally, sociologists and anthropologists have demonstrated the existence of social distance between Kinh and ethnic minority people in various contexts of Viet Nam. The sociologist Vu Hong Phong (2013) conducted field work on interethnic relationship in Muong Khen, a rural town in northwest mountainous Viet Nam where Muong, native to the area, and Kinh, internal migrants, are living together. It shows complex interethnic relations resulting from inflow of Kinh migrants from lowland provinces, the settlement of Kinh families in Muong villages, the establishment of multiethnic rural cooperatives, the Viet Nam War, and the economic reform (Đổi mới) which dismantled the rural cooperatives and urged many Kinh families to leave Muong villages. Although cooperation between Kinh and Muong people can be found, a lot of tensions remain due to competition over resources and stereotypes. According to the author, many Kinh still ascribe 'drinking heavily', 'nepotism' (cục bộ) and 'backwardness' (lạc hậu) to the Muong; meanwhile, many Muong still think that the Kinh 'look down' at them, and attribute 'lacking in sentiments ' and 'cunning' (Vu Hong Phong, 2013, p.175) . Looking at the prevalence of interethnic relationships which is higher among Muong than that among Kinh, the author concludes that social distance between Muong and Kinh seems to be bigger for Kinh than for Muong. Similar results are found by the anthropologist Dương Bích Hạnh (2008) in the context of Sa Pa in the Northern highlands between Hmong and Kinh, or by McElwee (2008) between Kinh and several minority groups, including Vân Kiju, Pa Cô, Pa Hy, and Ka Tu in the mountains of the central coast where cultural stereotypes held by both sides, Kinh migrants and minorities, continue to shape social 7 relations. Thus, prejudice and stereotypes regarding ethnic minority people are prevalent, and the media contributes to spread them, as shown by ISEE (2011) in a review of 500 articles from the four most popular newspapers.
Social distance between ethnic minorities and the majority, which may not be symmetric, could lead to the segregation of ethnic minority people from Kinh network, through inbreeding homophily process. Studying the Hmong in northern Viet Nam, the anthropologist Jean Michaud (2008) shows that in Sa Pa and Bac Hà, despite the local ethnic composition where Hmong constitute the majority, not only political entities like Popular Committee are dominated by Kinh people, but also they favour Kinh entrepreneurs at least by cultural inclinations. Consequently, Hmong are excluded from Kinh economic networks.
3
The data and definition
Data source
This study uses the Viet Nam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS). 5 The survey has been then implemented every two years from 2008 to 2016 in 467 rural communes; with more than 2,200 households each year and a balanced panel of 2,131 households (Brandt and Tarp, 2017) . Those provinces include one province in the Red River Delta, four provinces in the North; three in the Central Coast, three in Central Highlands and one on Mekong River Delta. The data is representative at provincial level. The survey covers a wide range of issues both at the commune and household level, including access to resources, shocks, risk coping and migration.
We also match the data with the Viet Nam Census of 2009
6 to obtain information on ethnic composition and occupation at the commune level. We are able to calculate the share of each ethnic group in the commune and construct an index of ethnic and occupational heterogeneity at the commune level. A third source of data is accessed from GeoQuery 7 that help us get information on the geographic contexts. We match the three databases by commune names. Due to the matching gap, we are able to match 428 communes out of 467 communes. Our study is then based on a sample of 11,180 observations in 428 communes.
Risk sharing networks measures
e use the name generator approach to measure risk sharing network; this approach has been widely employed in social network literature (Bidart and Charbonneau, 2012) . In VARHS, the name generator tool is used to ask each household head to name the three most important 8 contacts that he/she would ask for help in case of cash emergency; 8 then, a series of questions are raised to get detailed information on ethnicity, occupation or living area of those contacts.
The advantage of using name generator approach in social network studies is that we are able to capture broadly rich data about one household's network (ego-centered network) composition. However, we use a censored measure of social network , which could lead to bias our results: since we only have information about the three most important contacts, it is likely that the household head would think first about the ones who are easily remembered, likely the closer of his/her contacts, such as relatives or co-ethnic people. Burt (1986) identified it in network data as the ʻkinship biasʼ. In other words, risk sharing network based on this censored information could be more homophile in general; the bridging tie or heterogeneity in their network would be underestimated accordingly. As a result, the difference in risk sharing network between Kinh and non-Kinh, due to the higher heterogeneity in Kinh's network, could be underestimated. We will take this potential bias into account in interpreting our results. Detailed discussion of the censored network bias is in Appendix 2.
Corresponding to the research questions and hypothesis we raise, risk sharing network of the households are investigated by size and by similarity feature. Firstly, size of the household's network is measured by the total number of people that the households could reach for if they need help. This measure does not rely on the name generators but on a general question on how many people can be asked for help in case of cash emergency. Therefore, the size of the network is not censored.
Secondly, based on the name generators, we calculate the same ethnic ties proportion within the risk sharing network of each household in order to examine whether the likelihood of Kinh to link up with another Kinh is higher than their relative share in the commune. In fact, this coethnic share in their network is not limited within ʻKinh and non-Kinhʼ but corresponds to the ethnicity of the household. For instance, if the household head is Thai, we can calculate the proportion of Thai in his/her network.
We measure the network's similarity by: i) the proportion of same occupation ties 9 ; and ii) the proportion of within-village contacts in their risk sharing network.
10 The underlying reason for our indicator selection is that depending on the type of shocks, these characteristics of household's risk sharing network will play a different role. To cope with a covariant shock that happened at the village scale, knowing someone from another village could benefit the household (Bramouillé and Kranton, 2007) ; and to cope with a covariant shock which is related to household's business and occurs on a large scale, knowing someone who has a different occupation will be an advantage (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) . 8 More specifically, the question asked is: ʻIf you were in need of money in case of an emergency, who outside of your household could you turn to; who would be willing to provide this assistance?ʼ This question is widely used in the literature to capture risk-sharing networks. 9 For each contact named, the household head is asked: ʻDoes [NAME] have the same occupation like yours?ʼ. The proportion of same occupation ties is the ratio between the number of contacts for whom the household head answered yes to this question, and the total number of contacts.
Ethnic groups: definition, distribution and heterogeneity
In this study, we consider a household as ethnic minority if the head of the household belongs to any other ethnic groups than Kinh majority. Ethnic identification is one of the main concerns in studies on ethnic minorities since it is considered as 'multidimensional, fluid and contextual' (Pasquier-Doumer and Brandon, 2015) . Thus, the literature provides two approaches to identify ethnicity, which are self-identification and objective ethnic markers, in which language is the most common measure used in the later concept. In Viet Nam, however, official classification exists and it is widely accepted by the population. According to this official category, Kinh ethnic group which accounts for 85 per cent of the population is considered as the ethnic majority while 53 other ethnic groups are defined as ethnic minority groups in Viet Nam. Thus, selfassessment is employed to identify ethnicity in administration data and surveys like the 2009 Census and VARHS. Although the Hoa/Chinese group is often combined with Kinh as the majority in several studies due to the well-off status of the Hoa (van de Walle and Gunewardena, 2000), we consider them as an ethnic minority since there are only four Hoa households in VARHS data.
We are aware of the fact that ethnic minority is not a ʻhomogenous' group and it would be ideal to distinguish each group. However, due to the small number of observations of each ethnic minority group, our study mainly focuses on aggregating all ethnic minority groups as one group in order to compare with Kinh majority. In an extension, we decompose the ethnic minority groups into Thai, Tay, Hmong and others. The choice is based on the fact that these groups are among the four largest ethnic minority groups in Viet Nam, and thus account for a nonnegligible share in our sample of ethnic minorities. Another limitation is that we are not able to take into account inter-ethnic marriage of the heads of household that may affect the composition of their network. Unfortunately, we do not have information on ethnicity of any other household member than the household head, so we are not able to control for this effect. However, inter-ethnic marriage are rare in Vietnam. According to our own calculation with the 2009 Census, only 4 per cent of married people have a spouse from another ethnic group.
11 The more detailed analysis of Dang and Nguyen (2015) confirms the low prevalence of inter-ethnic marriage in Vietnam, which suggests that the underestimation of the similarity in the ethnic composition of the network may be of little concern. In addition to ethnic distribution, we build a measure of ethnic diversity at the commune level, based on the 2009 Census data. In the literature on ethnic heterogeneity studies, the two most common measures of ethnic diversity are ethnic fragmentation and ethnic polarization (Esteban and Ray, 2011) . In this paper, we focus on the ethnic heterogeneity that is expected to strengthen inter-ethnic group social distance and thus ethnic inbreeding within groups. The ethnic polarization index is relevant for this purpose: theoretical and empirical studies have shown a close link between ethnic polarization and ethnic tension or conflict (Moltano and ReynalQuerol, 2005, Esteban and Ray, 2011) . The main idea is that ethnic tension is higher in a situation where an ethnic majority group faces a large ethnic minority group (Horowitz, 1985) , meaning ethnic conflict might occur more under the condition of a few relatively large-sized ethnic groups rather than in the case of one group facing several small-sized groups. If the ethnic tension is higher in a more polarized commune, the inter-ethnic connection between different groups would be lower, leading to a higher ethnic segregation in risk sharing network.
Geographical environment/ cost of physical distance
Our objective is to understand the direct and indirect role of ethnicity on network formation. In Viet Nam, ethnic minorities often live in geographically difficult environments (i.e. mountainous). A recurrent question in studies on ethnic gap in Viet Nam is whether ethnic gap is mostly determined by unobserved differences in living areas between ethnic groups, in particular remoteness (Baulch et al., 2007, Epprecht et al., 2009, van de Walle and Gunewardena, 200) . At the same time, according to the risk sharing network literature, physical distance is one barrier in forming the network (Jack and Suri, 2014; Aida, 2015; De Weerdt, 2004; Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) .
In our study, we use four different measures of physical distance or remoteness. First, we use elevation measure, indicating the mountainous areas. Second, we calculate the difference between the minimum and maximum of elevation in each commune; this measure would help us to identify the variation of the terrain height, within each commune. Indeed, given the same mean of elevation, living in a flat surface would be easier for people to travel rather than in a high, sloped terrain. Our third measure is the average travel time between a commune and the nearest city of at least 50,000 people. Our argument for this measure of distance is that the shorter the time in commuting, the less costly for people to reach out for a relatively further connection. Traveling time also overcomes the limitation of using distance in kilometres since we cannot control for the quality of roads. Besides, easy accessibility to a relatively big town provides higher opportunities for people to get access to bigger market for agricultural products, non-farm jobs, public services such as healthcare and education (Epprecht et al., 2009) , and other social-cultural activities; as a consequence, people can have more chance to diversify their network. Lastly, we use the night time light density from 1996 to 2000 as a proxy for the differences in development of each area. As recently discussed in the literature, nighttime light intensity is considered as a good proxy for economic activity and development (Henderson et al., 2012, Hodler and Raschky, 2014) . In turn, travel cost are supposed be negatively associated with economic activity and development. We use all geographical data for the year 2000 and before to mitigate any reverse causality biases.
Descriptive statistics
We compare various household characteristics, including their shock exposure, the characteristics of the risk sharing network of their head, and their geographical environment, between ethnic groups, as well as between ethnic groups in mixed and non-mixed communes 12 .
Table 1 presents the differences in demographic and welfare characteristics between Kinh and non-Kinh households. Kinh households have smaller household size; are less likely to engaged in farming activities and have higher education level. Even the proportion of household head or spouse born in the village is high for both groups, non-Kinh still accounts for a higher rate of native people. Regarding welfare, it is seen that Kinh households are always better off than ethnic minorities in terms of annual income per capita; they have higher savings and also better access to informal loans. Kinh households are less likely to receive public transfers but compensated by higher probability of having private transfer. It is also noticeable that across all indicators, the welfare gaps are widened in mixed communes. Table 2 presents the differences in shock exposure between ethnic minorities and majority. The VARHS data allows us to examine different types of shocks, including covariant shocks and idiosyncratic shocks. Within covariant shocks, it is also possible to distinguish between natural shocks such as floods, typhoons or pest infestation, and economic shocks such as crop price changes or input price changes. Idiosyncratic shocks include health shocks or death of the household's members, crime or theft, divorce or family dispute. In general, covariant shocks are much more prevalent than idiosyncratic shocks. In addition, ethnic minority households are more likely to be exposed to shocks than Kinh households, and this difference is driven by their higher likelihood of facing natural shocks. Meanwhile, Kinh households reveal that they face more idiosyncratic shocks compared to ethnic minorities. In fact, health shock is the main driven factor of idiosyncratic shocks, and the higher health shocks answered by Kinh could be likely due to subjective perception of illness. It is well known that illness perception is positively correlated by wealth, which may explain that Kinh could be more likely to declare health issue even if their illness incidence is not higher than for non-Kinh. We thus observe that the non-Kinh are worse off than Kinh and at the same time, they are more exposed to covariant shocks. Differences in risk sharing networks of Kinh and non-Kinh are explored in Table 3 . Regarding the size of their networks, Kinh are more likely to have larger networks. Kinh households have on average 4 contacts in their network while the size is only 3.3 for non-Kinh households. Difference in network size holds true whatever mixed or non-mixed communes are considered. Regarding the structure of their network, we find that proportion of the same ethnic ties in household's risk sharing network is significantly higher for Kinh than for non-Kinh. This result is in line with our inbreeding homophily hypothesis according to which non-Kinh would be segregated from Kinh's network since Kinh are more likely to link with another Kinh.
We explore the similarity among contacts in the networks in terms of occupation and location. As expected, the network of Kinh is more diverse while the network of ethnic minority groups is more homophile. The proportion of contacts having the same occupation is higher for ethnic minority households: 79 per cent of ethnic minorities' risk sharing network is people doing the same jobs while the proportion is only around 50 per cent for Kinh. Regarding the location, the network is more limited within the village for ethnic minorities than for the Kinh majority. In other word, Kinh households are more likely to ask for help across villages. Given our interest in the role of social distance and remoteness, we explore how social and geographical environment's factors vary between non-mixed and mixed communes in Table 4 . All indicators show that geographic distances are worse in mixed communes where ethnic minority mostly live than in non-mixed communes: mixed-communes are characterized not only by high altitude mountainous areas but also by a large variance of elevation/uneven terrain, high travel time to the nearest 50,000 population city and low level of night time light. Accordingly, ethnic minority groups living in ethnically heterogeneous environment have more constraints to build a diverse network because transportation cost inside the commune is higher suggesting higher transaction cost with people out of the village. These geographical differences come along with less occupation diversity in mixed-communes as shown by the higher share of farming activities in these communes or the lower value of the index of occupational diversity. 13 This reflects lower opportunities in mixed-communes to form diverse risk sharing network in terms of occupation than in non-mixed communes. There is, even though not new, a striking difference between Kinh and non-Kinh's welfare and shock experience. Ethnic minority people are also found to be more vulnerable due to aggregate shocks, meanwhile their risk sharing networks are characterized by higher similarity, which would prevent them from coping with those shocks, according to the literature. The gaps between them stay unchanged or even larger in some indicators when we look at those who live in mixed areas. Lastly, ethnic minorities live in more diverse communities and remote areas, which are supposed to be highly correlated with low level of network diversity.
Econometric analysis
Empirical strategy
As shown in Section 4 risk sharing networks strongly differ between the Kinh majority and ethnic minorities, , the first ones being larger, more homogenous in terms of ethnicity, but more diverse regarding other characteristics (occupation and geographic locations).
The empirical analysis aims at identifying the main drivers of these differences. Indeed, they could result from various factors and mechanisms, which are either linked directly to ethnicity, or only indirectly. Understanding the nature of the links, and thus source of inequality, is important, in order to design appropriate policy measures.
For instance, the observed gap may be due to differences in environment that result from the spatial segregation in rural areas between Kinh, and ethnic minority populations. Rural Kinh households tend to live mostly in lowland areas, closer to urban centres, while ethnic minorities are historically settled in upland areas, which are more remote and less accessible. Different migration waves in the past decades have increased ethnic mix in both upland and lowland areas, yet, as Figure 2 shows, segregation is still strong. Infrastructures are also less developed in upland areas, partly because they are more costly, and these are also less populated areas, making it more difficult for anyone to interact with another outside his or her village. Different environment could result in different network characteristics.
Moreover, education and wealth being two important predictors of the size and the quality of networks (Fafchamps and Gubert, 2007) , the Kinh, who have better access to education, and tend to occupy more often elite positions (in the political or economic sphere) than other ethnic groups, are likely to have 'better networks'.
The objective of this paper is to shed light, beyond these factors, on the other mechanisms at play directly linked to ethnicity and that drive these differences. Homophily is a well described and important mechanism in risk sharing network formation (see section 2). Individuals minimize the costs of establishing and maintaining relations by connecting with other individuals sharing the same characteristics, ethnicity for instance. As detailed in the literature review, one can consider two types of homophily. The first one is baseline homophily, and is linked to demography (or to the relative size of groups of certain characteristics) and to the opportunities to network with individuals sharing the same characteristics. The other type is inbreeding homophily and is linked to preferences to form a link with individuals sharing the same characteristics. Both mechanisms result in differentiated networks between different ethnic groups. In the first case, differences between Kinh and non-Kinh networks are explained by the fact that the first are more numerous. In the second case, individuals tend to select themselves in order to remain in homogenous networks, even when they live in highly heterogeneous environments. Disentangling these two mechanisms is important, as indeed, inequalities when the second mechanism is at play are particularly difficult to address, as they are based on some type of discrimination.
To uncover the prevalence of these factors and mechanism, we estimate a series of models explaining risk sharing network characteristics, introducing step by step various sets of covariates that account for different factors.
We start with a model of risk sharing network size that strictly accounts for household characteristics, ethnicity, as well as time and spatial fixed effects:
Where is the log of number of helpers a household i, from commune j at time t could rely on in case of a cash need.
is a set of household characteristics, that includes age, sex of the head, and whether he/she or her/his spouse is native of the village.
is a variable indicating the ethnicity of the head. In the basic form of the model, it simply indicates whether the head is Kinh or not. are year dummies 14 , are district fixed effects, and , the interaction of both. is the error term, and is constituted a commune-level and an household component that can be written as follow:
, the ethnic variable, captures the difference in network characteristics between ethnic groups that is not captured by other variables. Our aim is to understand what explains this difference, simply by adding successively various sets of household or commune level variables, that are likely to further explain risk sharing networks, and are correlated with the ethnic dummy. This way, we get a grasp of what triggers differences in risk sharing networks, between wealth, geography and demography. Additionally, this enables us to disentangle the mechanisms of baseline and inbreeding homophily.
We first add in the model two variables describing ethnic demography within communes. The first one is a variable that measures the share of household heads' co-ethnics in the commune's population, and the second is an index of ethnic polarization, that measures the relative size of each ethnic groups within the commune as described in section 3.3. The introduction of the coethnic share variable enables a direct test of baseline ethnic homophily, as indeed, if characteristics of the networks -namely the size or the share of co-ethnics within risk sharing networks -evolve along with the relative size of ethnic groups within communes, we can conclude that baseline homophily is likely to drive risk sharing network formation. Furthermore, if after introducing the variable, the ethnic one is no longer significant, then baseline homophily is the main mechanism at play, and inbreeding homophily is absent. But if both the share and the ethnic variables are significant, then inbreeding mechanisms should be at work. Ethnic polarization index accounts both for ethnic heterogeneity in the commune and for the relative size of the groups. Indeed, the literature on ethnic diversity and ethnic polarization suggests that not only does one's own relative size matter in the interaction between groups, but also the distribution of other groups (see Arcand and Jamovich, 2014) .
In the next model, in order to test whether observed effects are driven by the environment, we add commune covariates capturing the geographic context at the commune level ( ). In all models, district fixed effects already control to some extent for geographic conditions. Yet, the situation may vary quite strongly within districts, in terms of accessibility notably, and thus we add commune level controls (see section 3). Lagged data are used when available in order to limit risks of endogeneity, coming from the fact that social cohesion within a commune could be an unobservable omitted variable explaining both some features of risk sharing networks, and the quality of public goods or economic growth.
Following this, we add various variables measuring households socio-economic conditions. The education of the head is accounted for, a dummy variable indicating whether he is a farmer is introduced. Finally, a variable of wealth measured by the log of the total value of assets possessed is included. This variable is expected to capture households' permanent income, and to be less volatile than other conventional measures based on income or expenditure. We anticipate that household wealth is strongly correlated with both risk sharing network and ethnicity and thus that it captures part of the difference between ethnic groups. If the ethnic variable becomes insignificant, this is a sign that observed gap mostly hinges on wealth differences, or in other word, this would mean that if ethnic minorities were able to reach the same level of wealth than the Kinh, their risk sharing network would not differ significantly. However, we must note that these variables are potentially endogenous and their coefficients should be interpreted with care.
We then add commune fixed effects to account for all additional heterogeneity between communes that is not accounted for in the geography or ethnic polarization variable. We expect indeed that in addition to geography and polarization, other invariant commune characteristics, related to institutions or social cohesion for instance may affect network characteristics. In the fixed effects estimates, coefficients are interpreted as within-communes effects. For instance the ethnic dummy variable captures the effect of being Kinh compared to other non-Kinh households within a commune, thus in mixed communes only.
Finally, in the last model, we test whether baseline and inbreeding homophily mechanisms vary when ethnic groups are a minority or a majority within the commune, by interacting the ethnic variable with the share of co-ethnics.
15 Indeed, there is evidence from the literature that social distance between ethnic groups may strongly vary according to the relative size of each group.
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The Kinh for instance may form different networks whether they constitute a minority in the commune's population, or whether they are the major group.
In all of the above models, the dichotomization of the ethnic (i.e. Kinh vs. non-Kinh) may appear too simplistic, especially considering that Viet Nam counts 54 different ethnic groups, and that there is considerable heterogeneity between the different ethnic groups in how socially distant they are from the Kinh. We thus estimate the same model as above, but this time, the ethnic variable distinguishes five groups: the Kinh, the Thai, the Tay, the Hmong, and the rest of ethnic groups (see section 3.3). The first category is used as reference in all regressions. We also interact this categorical variable with the share of co-ethnics in order to see whether the different ethnic groups react similarly to Kinh when they are a minority in a commune or a majority. 15 In the basic form of the model, we test whether mechanisms vary when Kinh people are a minority or a majority in the commune by interaction the dummy of being Kinh with the share of co-ethnics of the head. In the more sophisticated model, we test it by considering four ethnic groups, Kinh, Thai, Tay and Hmong. 16 See for instance Posner (2004) who studies the social relations between two ethnic groups that are adversaries in Malawi but allies in Tanzania. He shows that this can largely be explained by the relative size of each group within both countries' population where they are two of the main groups in the first countries, and minorities in the second.
The objective of this empirical strategy is to detect mechanisms at play in the formation of risk sharing networks, and in particular the existence of inbreeding homophily. We detect this last one by controlling for all possible factors that can capture variation between ethnic groups, the remaining effect in the ethnic variable is interpreted as inbreeding homophily, i.e. as ethnically based preference. Yet, if an omitted factor, which is not preference but is correlated with both risk sharing network characteristics and ethnicity, remain in the error term, the coefficient of the ethnic variable is likely to be biased. We thus estimate the model adding commune-level fixed effects, and removing all commune-level variables, to check whether our results can be explained by such omitted factors. Individual omitted variables may be another source of endogeneity bias. If people have migrated to the community because of past shocks or other unobserved characteristics, the share of co-ethnics in the community may be endogeneous as unobserved individual characteristics explained both the choice of the community -and thus the share of coethnics-and the features of the network. Although this bias due to migration cannot be ruled out, we implement a robustness check which tests whether our results remain true when only people who were born in the community are considered (83 per cent of Kinh people and 87 per cent of non-Kinh people).
We estimate similar models to explain four characteristics of risk sharing networks described in section 4. The first is network size, models are estimated using log-linear regressions. The second is the share of co-ethnics within risk sharing networks, estimated through tobit regressions, then come models of geographic similarity, measured by the share of network members living in the same village as the head, and then models of occupational similarity, i.e. the share of network members having the same occupation as the head.
Results
Determinants of household network size
Results from the OLS estimates are shown in Table 5 . 17 We find a positive and significant effect of the Kinh dummy, that persists after the introduction of ethnic composition variables (column (2)) and of geographic variables (column (3)). The coefficient becomes insignificant, however, when we include in the model households socio-economic variables such as education, wealth and occupation (column (4)). Both wealth and education have positive and significant coefficients, which is not surprising. Thus, Kinh households may have larger networks than others, mostly because they are richer, are more educated, and thus may hold higher social positions, and not directly because of their ethnicity.
This result generalizes Fischer et al. (2010) 's findings. Their study analyses the social network of 33 ethnic minority individuals living in the uplands of Northern Viet Nam. It shows that household's level of wealth is an influential factor with regard to the formation and size of the network, mostly because of the cost of maintaining relationships. Poorer households purposely refrain from asking for help from their sparse networks because they fear being unable to reciprocate later.
Yet, wealth does not capture all of the ethnic effect, as once we control for commune fixed effects, the Kinh dummy becomes again significant (columns (5) and (7)). This indicates that fixed effects control for some unobserved commune characteristics, other than geography, that are both correlated to network size and to ethnicity. We could think for instance to customs, social cohesion or other institutional characteristics that vary between communes, and are correlated with the presence of Kinh.
The effect of the Kinh dummy variable on network size could be due to a homophily mechanisms : because they are more numerous, they have larger networks. Yet, the variable controlling for the share of co-ethnics is significant in none of the regressions on network size. Its introduction does not affect the coefficient on the ethnic variable, and the interaction of the two is also insignificant (column (7)). Therefore, we interpret the effect of the Kinh dummy as a preference effect for larger networks.
Determinants of ethnic similarity within risk sharing networks
We then estimate the determinants of ethnic similarity. Results of the tobit estimates are reported in Table 6 . 18 We observe a positive and significant effect of the Kinh dummy on the share of coethnics among network members. This effect changes in magnitude, but remains positive and significant after introducing variables on ethnic composition within the commune (column (2)), variables controlling for differences in geography (column (3)), or variables capturing household socio-economic conditions (column (4)). This is an indication that inbreeding homophily is at play, and that this mechanism is stronger for the Kinh than for the non-Kinh, i.e. that the former have stronger preference for connecting to co-ethnics than the latter.
Yet, we also observe that the magnitude of the ethnic effect is reduced once the share of household head's co-ethnics is controlled for (column (2)). This variable has a strong positive and significant effect on the ethnic homogeneity of social network, indicating that baseline homophily is at play in the formation of risk sharing networks: the more co-ethnics one has in the commune, the more he or she has in his or her network. Kinh risk sharing networks are thus also more homogenous because they live in communes with a higher share of co-ethnics.
19
In column (7) the interaction of both the ethnic and the share of co-ethnics is introduced. Results show that when Kinh are a minority, their network is ethnically more diverse, as the coefficient on the Kinh dummy becomes negative and significant. However, when the number of Kinh increases in the commune (share of co-ethnics), their networks become more homogenous. The positive and significant sign of the share of co-ethnics alone indicates that baseline homophily is also at play for the non-Kinh, but the effect appears stronger for the Kinh.
In the appendix, Table A1 , we run the regressions (5) to (7) with commune fixed effects and decompose ethnic variable into different ethnic groups. Results confirm that the Kinh are specific in how inbreeding and homophily mechanisms apply, compared to all other ethnic groups. All have significantly lower preferences for homogenous networks than the Kinh. Additionally, the baseline homophily mechanism also applies for other ethnic group but with a significantly lower magnitude, compare to the Kinh.
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The other control variables also display interesting result. First, we test whether the positive Kinh effect that we interpret as preference could be due to the fact that they have larger networks, and that the effect is due to the fact that the ethnicity of network members is only asked for three members, thus on a censored sample. We test and control for such bias by introducing in all models a dummy variable indicating whether the household indicated having more than three contacts whom to ask help in case of need, and another variable reporting the total number of potential helpers. These variables have insignificant coefficients, unless in the commune fixed effect models where they have expected sign, i.e. a positive censoring effect, and a negative network size effect.
Then, we find that ethnic similarity in risk sharing networks is negatively influenced by the level of ethnic polarization (columns (2)- (4)), often used to test for the potential conflicts that may emerge when several groups of similar size coexist. We would thus expect that a higher ethnic polarization would pull population apart, and accentuate segregation within networks. However, the negative and significant sign of the coefficient shows that quite the opposite occurs: the more the commune is polarized, the lower the inbreeding homophily. In fact, among 23 communes where the polarization index is higher than 0.9, we find 21 communes where the Kinh share a comparable size with another ethnic group such as Thai, Tay, Ede or Co Ho. These groups are amongst the well-off minority groups with relatively high level of education (MRDI, 2014), thus, it is possible that the social distance between these groups and the Kinh is shortened, facilitating ethnic integration.
Taken all together these results indicate that both baseline and inbreeding mechanisms are at play in the formation of risk sharing networks in rural Vietnam, but that these two mechanisms are stronger for the Kinh than for other ethnic groups.
Determinants of geographic similarity within risk sharing networks
Another particularly important feature of a risk sharing network lies in its geographic dispersion. A high proportion of the shocks faced by populations in rural areas are related to climate, and affect whole populations within a given areas. Thus, one's capacity to rely on someone located outside its immediate environment, when such a shock occurs will affect its ability to face it. The literature from the new economics of migration has well shown for instance that the departure of some family members to further places is partly driven by the necessity to insure the rest of the family. Also, a recent study by Jaimovich (2014) highlights the importance of external economic links which help to connect missing markets in the isolated communities.
We look here at the determinants of geographic proximity of risk sharing network members, measured by the share of the network members who live in the same village as the household head. Results of the tobit estimates are reported in Table 7 .
The Kinh networks are more geographically spread than those of the non-Kinh, as was already shown in descriptive statistic and as we can see in the first estimation (column (1)). This result remains true when we introduce the ethnic composition variables (column (2)), and when we control by the geographic characteristics of the commune (column (3)) or more generally when we introduce commune fixed effects (column (5)). Risk sharing network from ethnic minority people are more likely to be confined within village boundaries, making ethnic minorities highly vulnerable to aggregated shocks. This result confirms what Fischer et al. (2010) find based on case studies of ethnic minority people in Northern Viet Nam. They show that the majority of help flows remains within the village. The rare cases where they go beyond the village boundary, the help flows come from the women's village of origin.
Yet, the Kinh dummy becomes insignificant once we control for wealth and education (column (4) and (6)). Similar to network size, the advantage of Kinh people in forming distant links is highly correlated with their higher socio-economic status. Likewise, we do not find any effect of communes' ethnic composition on the geographic proximity of risk sharing networks. Here again, there is no evidence that a high ethnic polarization would pull individuals apart and push them to remain within their village, but also no evidence that it helps to create more connections outside one 's village. 20 Column (7) shows that Kinh people have more geographically diverse networks than non-Kinh people when they constitute a minority in the commune, even when their socio-economic status is controlled for. The difference between Kinh and non-Kinh decreases when the share of Kinh people in the community increases. This finding correlates with higher inbreeding homophily among Kinh demonstrated in the previous section, as isolated Kinh people in a village have more incentive to go out the village to form link with other Kinh.
From all these results, we conclude that the ability to form geographically distant links is mostly correlated with education and wealth, rather than being a majority or minority. Similar results are found by distinguishing ethnic minorities groups (Appendix Table A1 ). Kinh households have a more efficient risk sharing network in that aspect because they are usually endowed with a higher education level and they are richer than ethnic minorities. Thus, despite being more numerous and spread in the whole territory, Kinh people are not more able to form and maintain links out of the village than other ethnic groups once their socio-economic characteristics are taken into account. Baseline and inbreeding homophily are therefore not determinant mechanisms of geographic similarity in risk sharing network.
Determinants of occupational similarity
Last, we look at the occupational similarity within risk sharing networks. Occupational similarity is defined by the proportion of people in the risk sharing network having the same occupation than the household's head. Occupational similarity is an important characteristic of risk sharing networks, particularly in rural areas where incomes and consumption fluctuate strongly within a year, and where covariant shocks are prevalent. The estimation strategy is the same than for geographic similarity, except that we control from column (3) by the occupational diversity in the commune, and the share of people in the community having the same occupation as the head. Indeed, the diversity of occupations in household head's risk sharing network should highly depend on the diversity of occupations found in the commune. In order to isolate the effect of the distribution of ethnic groups and their social distance from the differences in local labour markets, we built an index of occupational diversity in the communes using 2009 census data on occupation of all adults in the commune in the last seven days. This index has to be interpreted as the probability that two people taken randomly in a commune have different occupations. 21 Therefore, the higher the index, the larger the spectrum of occupations within the commune. 20 A limitation in this study is that we have no information on the ethnic composition at the village-level. It may well be that even in very heterogeneous communes, villages remain completely homogenous ethnically. However, the fact that there is a positive effect of polarization on the ethnic diversity within networks (Table 6 ), but a nonsignificant effect on the geographic similarity (Table 7) , is an indication that when there is ethnic diversity at the commune level, there is also, to some extent, diversity within the villages. 21 More precisely, this index is built as a fragmentation index calculated as below:
where π ic is the proportion of people with occupation i in a commune c and N is the total of number of occupation in the commune. Occupation is defined here as the 2-digit code of the 2007 Viet Nam standard industrial classification.
22 Table 8 shows that the Kinh variable is negative and significant in all specifications. Kinh individuals have more occupational diversity within their risk sharing networks than individuals from other ethnic groups, everything else being equal. This is not because they live in communes where the labour market is more diversified (column (3)), nor because Kinh people live in less remote communes (column (4)). In addition, this result persists when ethnic minority groups are considered separately (Appendix Table A1 ).
We find a positive and significant association between occupational similarity of the network and the share of co-ethnics in the commune (columns (2) to (7)) suggesting that baseline homophily is at play. Besides, occupational similarity is not associated with ethnic polarization .
Three interpretations can be drawn from these results. First, Kinh are more likely to have diverse network in terms of occupation because they are more able to form and maintain links out of the village, and ties out of the village are supposed to connect more frequently with people having different occupation. However, results on geographic similarity go against this first interpretation. They show that Kinh people are not more able to form and maintain links out of the village than other ethnic groups once their socio-economic characteristics are taken into account. Thus, according to this interpretation, Kinh variables should not be significant once socio-economic characteristics are taken into account.
The second interpretation is that Kinh people are more likely to occupy elite positions, and as such to play the role of structural hole (Burt, 1995) . In other words, they are more likely to have positional advantages in the commune by connecting individuals or groups of individuals that are connected only through their intermediary. They are therefore connected with more diverse people whatever their ethnic group. But this interpretation can hold true only if socio-economic characteristics introduced in the model do not capture elite position. However, we believe that variables measuring education, the value of assets, and the dummy indicating whether the head is a farmer account for this positional effect. Thus if it was the main effect, these variables should absorb most of the Kinh variable effect in the regression.
A third interpretation is that Kinh people occupy a larger spectrum of occupations than nonKinh people, and in addition, that they are more likely to link with other Kinh, excluding ethnic minorities from their network. Consequently, the people with whom ethnic minorities can form link have a reduced set of occupations. We have shown that Kinh are more likely to link with other Kinh through inbreeding homophily process (section 5.2.2), and that ethnic minorities have restrained opportunities to link with Kinh people. In order to see whether occupational diversity within a commune is higher among Kinh than among other ethnic groups, we calculate the index of occupational diversity among Kinh people in a commune and compare it with the index of occupational diversity among other ethnic groups. We find that considering only Kinh people within a rural commune and selecting randomly two of them, the probability that they have different occupation is 0.524 (sd 0.243). Doing the same simulation for non-Kinh people, the probability is significantly lower, at 0.167 (sd 0.211). The probabilities are almost the same when we consider only mixed communes with both Kinh and non-Kinh. Therefore, we conclude to a higher occupational diversity among Kinh people at the commune level compared to ethnic minorities. From these results, we conclude that inbreeding homophily combined with higher diversity in occupations within Kinh people is likely to be an important driver of differences between majority and minority ethnic groups regarding occupational similarity of risk sharing network. 
Robustness checks
We test the robustness of our results relying on three strategies. A first concern is that our results are driven by the data of a specific year. Indeed, we chose to pool the five rounds of data surveys in order to smooth measurement errors in measuring network size and attributes due to declaration bias. We thus re-estimate all the models on sub-samples excluding one of the five years of survey, and starting from our favorite specification with commune fixed effect (models 8). We find that the sign, the significance, and the magnitude of the coefficients of our two main independent variables of interest (the Kinh dummy and the share of co-ethnics in the commune) are generally not affected, whatever the year we chose to drop (Table 9 ). Exceptions are the two years of 2008 and 2012 but only regarding the effect of Kinh on network size. We conclude that our results are not driven by a specific year.
A second concern is related to potential endogeneity bias of the share of co-ethnics in the commune due to the fact that some heads of household have chosen their community, and that this choice is driven by unobserved characteristics that may explain the feature of their network as well. To test it, we conduct our estimation on a sub-sample of people for whom the choice of the community is guaranteed to be exogenous because they were born there. Around 17 per cent of the observation have been dropped. Again, we find that this specification does not change our results, except for the coefficient of Kinh in network size regression.
A third concern is that mixed communes are very heterogeneous with some communes with very low population of Kinh people. As these Kinh people and communities may be very specific, they can drive our results and make our conclusion fragile. Therefore, we re-estimate our models by excluding this kind of communes. Among mixed communes where Kinh lives, we dropped observations of the commune with a polarization index below the median value in order to increase the relative size between different ethnic groups in a mixed commune. We thus guarantee that Kinh people constitute a non-negligible group in the community compared to another ethnic minority group. Results remain unchanged with this specification. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the differences in the risk sharing networks of Viet Nam's ethnic minorities and majority, as a way to approach the question of the persistence of the ethnic gap in Viet Nam. Exploiting a very rich rural household data set collected between 2008 and 2016 in several provinces of Viet Nam, the paper first shows evidence of important dissimilarities between Kinh and non-Kinh households in the size of these networks, as well as in their composition. The networks of the first group are on average larger, ethnically more homogenous, but more diverse in terms of occupation and geographic location than those of other ethnic groups. This could be an important source of horizontal inequality, as larger and diverse networks could enable the Kinh majority to better face covariant shocks than ethnic minorities. We show that such shocks are indeed prevalent in Viet Nam rural area.
In order to better understand this source of inequality, we analyse network differences and explore various mechanisms that could lead to this gap in addition to the geographic and socioeconomic factors. We combine survey data with census and geo-referenced data that provide detailed contextual information on the geography and the demography of sampled communes. We investigates mechanisms that are directly or indirectly linked to ethnicity and are likely to explain observed differences. Among the indirect factors, we consider household endowments, wealth, and geography; while direct mechanisms refer to effects of demography (or baseline homophily), and preference effects (or inbreeding homophily). Multivariate regressions explaining different features of risk sharing networks are estimated to disentangle these effects.
First, we find evidence that the gaps between Kinh and non-Kinh risk sharing networks are at least partly driven by the social distance that exists between ethnic groups in Viet Nam, particularly between the Kinh and the non-Kinh. Indeed, households from the first group are found to have higher preferences for inbreeding homophily, i.e. for networks only composed of co-ethnics, compared to other groups, even in highly mixed communes. By forming such networks, they exclude ethnic minorities from their networks which are larger, more diverse geographically, and in terms of occupation. We also find evidence that the greater occupational diversity observed in Kinh networks is a consequence of this inbreeding behaviour, as Kinh occupy more diverse positions than the non-Kinh in all types of communes. Results indicate furthermore that the Kinh have higher preferences for larger networks than other groups.
Along with these results that relate to household preferences, our findings indicate that the differences in the social networks of the two groups also partly hinge on the demographic differences between ethnic groups, and on the fact that the Kinh are by far more numerous than other groups. Consequently, they have higher opportunities to link up with other co-ethnics. This demographic effect however does not explain why Kinh networks are larger, and geographically more widely spread.
These findings must be added to those of the literature exploring the causes of Viet Nam's persistent ethnic gaps. Most of these papers highlight the existence of inequalities in the endowments between ethnic groups with a strong emphasis on geographical factor, but also show differences in the returns to these endowments between Kinh and non-Kinh. According to the literature, the ethnic gap will not be solved through redistributive policies alone and the inequalities need to be explored more profoundly.
Our contribution to this literature is first to show that the differences between Kinh and nonKinh risk sharing networks could be an important source of inequality in rural areas where risk is pervasive. Our paper is in line with and goes beyond the suggested evidences of ethnic segmentation in social networks (Singhal and Beck, 2015) . Indeed, the lower efficiency of ethnic minorities' risk sharing networks for dealing with covariant shocks, combined with their greater vulnerability, is likely to explain why their returns to endowments are lower. Finally, we find that differences in networks cannot be explained by differences in endowments, geography or demography alone, but that they are partly rooted in the cultural and social distances that exist between the Kinh and other ethnic groups. This suggests that, unless those distances are reduced, ethnic inequalities in Viet Nam are likely to persist. 
